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After the discovery of oil, many Arab Gulf States failed to diversify and expand 
their economies beyond the oil sector. Resource curse theory contends these states, also 
known as rentier states, exhibited slower economic development than other states due to 
their dependency on oil. Dubai has been classified as a rentier state, however, it has 
achieved significant economic growth and political st bility. Kuwait and Qatar were 
selected as case studies to compare and contrast with Dubai. Dubai’s growth can be 
attributed to its rulers’ decisions prior to and after the discovery of oil and the growing 
role of the merchant class in the state. Therefore, the resource curse theory alone cannot 







Since the discovery of oil, Arab Gulf States, exuberantly rich by any measure 
have not managed to utilize oil revenues to build an diversify their economies. Indeed, 
the prevailing wisdom is that oil discovery has been more of a curse than a blessing for 
the Arab Gulf States. Hence, over the past decade, sev ral oil-producing Arab Gulf states 
have actively sought to diversify their economies. With only 6% of its GDP currently 
derived from oil revenues, Dubai has exemplified this philosophy by incorporating trade, 
financial services, and constant expansion of its non-oil sector. 1 Nearby nations which 
rely heavily on oil have tried to follow this trend, but have been met with limited success.  
It is important to understand why Dubai was successful in diversifying its 
economy, while other oil-producing Gulf States previously failed to do so. To answer this 
question, one must compare and contrast the economic and political development of 
Dubai with that of similar Gulf States, both before and after the discovery of oil. Kuwait 
and Qatar are similar to Dubai in that they are constitutional monarchies with large ruling 
families, all have an area less than 6,000 square miles, and all share Islam as the state 
religion. Furthermore, all three states are demographic lly similar since they share a 
chiefly Arab ethnicity in which the nationals are the minority in each state.2 
                                                 
 
 
1 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geograpy. London, 
University of Portsmouth: 45. 
 
2 "CIA-The World Factbook."   Retrieved October, 2008. 
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The most popular theory that addresses the lack of development in oil-producing 
states is the resource curse theory, which contends that revenue received from the export 
of natural resources hinders both economic and political development by transforming 
the state from a production state to an allocation state.3 A clear cause of rent seeking 
behavior, oil dependency forces leaders to manipulate and maintain their power, which is 
generally concentrated in the hands of government officials and few elites, through 
corruption and patronage. This corruption and lack of transparency undermines 
democratic growth and the development of free market economies.4  Scholars Hazem 
Beblawi and Giacaomo Luciani argue that the rents from oil revenues prevent states from 
creating incentives based on productivity because stat s are focused on distributing oil 
revenues to the citizens.5 When rents from oil revenues are enough to provide adequate 
healthcare, education, and other services to citizens, allowing states to eliminate taxation, 
the need for citizens to be productive in order to earn these privileges is obviated.6 
The resource curse literature is immense, with scholars addressing different 
aspects of the economic and political development of resource-rich nations. Scholar 
Michael Ross, who has analyzed the political aspect of the resource curse theory, states 
that political development is hindered in resource-ri h nations due to the policy failures 




3 Ross, M. L. (1999). "The Political Economy of the R source Curse." World Politics 51: 297-322. 
4 Ross, M. (2001). "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53: 325-61. 





and shortsightedness of the state actors. Resource rents produce a “get rich quick” 
mentality among public and private actors by creating easy wealth. Second, resource 
boom may enhance the leverage of non-state actors who favor policies which hinder 
growth.7 However, in developing nations, non-state actors d not have first claim to the 
resource rents, which are often controlled by government officials. Ross also emphasizes 
the weakness and strength of institutions in allocating resources properly by resisting the 
demands of interest groups and rent seekers. Finally, Ross examines the political 
consequences of oil revenues by observing that oil hinders democratic growth in states.  
Prior to the discovery of oil, governments of states d pended on taxation services 
to fulfill their budgetary needs. After the discovery of oil, states can become free of any 
social contracts with their citizens, who often surrender their political rights for the social 
services and goods provided by the government. The growth of revenue can also prompt 
the state to increase military spending in order to strengthen its control. The growth of 
democracies in these states is hindered by the lack of political representation of citizens 
and by military growth.8   
Nations that depend on oil revenues for economic and political development are 
characterized as rentier states. According to Scholar Gwen Okruhlik, a rentier state is a 
state which depends on external sources such as oilrevenues for state income. In a rentier 
state, spending is based on primordial ties and political considerations rather than 
                                                 
 
 
7 Ross, M. L. (1999). "The Political Economy of the R source Curse." World Politics 51: 297-322. 
  
8 Ross, M. (2001). "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" Ibid. 53: 325-61. 
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economic rationality.9  Scholar Kiren Chaudhry classifies Gulf States in the Middle East 
as rentier states because the major oil-exporting sates are financially autonomous from 
their citizens. In addition, these states are distribu ive such that they can exist without 
extracting taxes and surplus from the local population. 10 Their bureaucracies are based 
on the need to allocate rather than the need to appropriate the revenues effectively. Oil 
revenues undercut the emergence of institutions and norms necessary for the construction 
of market economies.11 A consensus exists between scholars who have researched oil- 
dependent economies and they agree that an abundance of oil impedes development. 
Overall, countries that are dependent on oil as their primary export exhibit significantly 
slower economic development than other developing state .  
The history of development in Kuwait and Qatar resembl s that of rentier states 
after the discovery of oil. In Kuwait, taxation mechanisms with the merchant elites were 
eradicated and the government became the main distribute  of wealth to its citizens. In 
Qatar, the government was the sole beneficiary of the oil revenues and no merchant class 
existed to contest the distribution of oil revenues. 12 As a result, wealth created corruption 
and strife within the ruling family. Though Qatar and Kuwait can be classified as rentier 
                                                 
 
 
9 Okruhlik, G. (1999). "Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of 
Oil States." Comparative Politics 31(3): 295-315. 
  
10 Chaudhry, K. A. (1994). "Economic Liberalization ad the Lineages of the Rentier State." Ibid. 27(1): 1-
25. 
  
11 Chaudhry, K. A. (1989). "The Price of Wealth: business and state in labor remittance and oil economies." 
International Organizations 43: 101-144. 
  
12 Crystal, J. (1989). "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar." Comparative Politics 21(4): 427-
443. 
   
 5 
states, economic development is hindered due to the decisions of the rulers. In addition, 
the interaction between the government and merchant cl ss also impeded development.  
Dubai has been classified as a rentier state, but has nonetheless achieved 
remarkable economic growth and political stability. Dubai is a welfare state that provides 
services to its citizens, even though the percentag of its GDP coming from oil revenues 
is decreasing steadily.13 Dubai’s growth can be attributed to its rulers’ decisions prior to 
and after the discovery of oil and the growing role f the merchant class in the state.  
The case studies in this thesis will demonstrate that Dubai has enjoyed greater 
economic success than Kuwait and Qatar because of its leaders’ decisions to expand the 
state’s economic interests beyond one primary sector, both before and after the discovery 
of oil. In addition, the presence or absence of a merchant class has largely dictated the 
extent of business-government relations, economic development, and reform in all three 
states. To demonstrate this argument, the economic history of all three states is presented 






                                                 
 
 
13 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geography. London, 





The modern history of Dubai began when the Al-Maktoum family of the Bani 
Yas tribe took control from the Al Abu Falasa, another Bani Yas family, without 
resistance. In 1853, the Gulf Sheikhs, including the ruler of Dubai, signed the Treaty of 
Maritime Pace and Perpetuity with the British government, making Dubai one of the 
Trucial states. 14 In addition, the ruling monarchy of Dubai signed the Exclusives Treaties 
with Britain in 1892, which banned states from making deals with other governments 
without British consent. In 1966, small reserves of oil were discovered in Dubai and the 
export of oil began in 1969. 15 Dubai’s oil reserves were a faction of Abu Dhabi’s oil 
reserves and accounted for only a small percentage of Dubai’s income. The British 
government, extremely strained by maintaining a military presence around the world, 
announced a withdrawal of all forces located east of the Suez. 16 The Trucial states seized 
this opportunity and the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai created a federal system under 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 1971, a constitution was established where seven 
Sovereign emirates (states) were brought into one single nation. The emirates of UAE 
are: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Kaimah, Ajman, Umm Al-Qaiwan, and Fujairah. 
Abu Dhabi became the nation’s capital and each emirate was governed by individual 
                                                 
 
 
14 Matly, M. and L. Dillon (2007). Dubai Strategy: Past, Present, Future. Harvard Business School: 1-20. 
  
15 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geograpy. London, 





rulers.17 The national government of the UAE controls foreign policy and defense, but the 
ruler of each emirate retains absolute authority and is a member of the Supreme Council 
of Federation. This council is the state’s highest authority and elects the president of the 
UAE. The president of the UAE is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and is in 
charge of implementing national laws.18  
A very important characteristic of the UAE’s government is that the ruler of each 
emirate holds the autonomy to implement economic and political reform. Prior to the 
development of a national government, the rulers of Dubai played an instrumental role in 
devising successful economic development policies. In the 1900s, prior to the discovery 
of oil, the economy of the UAE was based on the pearling industry. The depression of the 
1930s and the introduction of Japanese pearls into the market contributed to the decline 
of the pearling industry in the UAE, causing an economic depression in Abu Dhabi. 
Dubai’s economy survived because its economy centerd on forms of trade exclusive of 
the pearling industry.19  
Sheikh Maktoum bin Hasher Al-Maktoum, Dubai’s leader from 1894-1906, was a 
progressive business leader who promoted trade and fostered development. He engaged 
in a variety of entrepreneurship activities by relocating merchants from the Persian city of 
Lingah, which was one of the Gulf’s major hubs for imports, exports, trading, and the 
pearling industry. When the Persian government becam  plagued by financial troubles, it 
                                                 
 
 
17 Mallakh, R. E. (1981). The Economic Development of the United Arab Emirates, St. Martin's Press New 
York. 
 
18 Matly, M. and L. Dillon (2007). Dubai Strategy: Past, Present, Future. Harvard Business School: 1-20. 
 
19 Economist.com. "Dubai- Historical Background." from www.theworldin.com. 
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was forced to impose taxes on Lingah merchants, who soon decided to move to a more 
beneficial location for their trading activities.20 Sheikh Maktoum bin Hasher capitalized 
on the opportunity of having Lingah merchants relocate to Dubai in order to attract 
foreign trade and commerce. He developed incentives and agreements for these 
merchants based on abolishing import and export tariffs, providing free land, and 
personal benefits.21 Furthermore, laws were established which promoted tolerance and 
support for merchants’ tribal, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Thus, with all these 
social and economic incentives, the merchants of Lingah relocated to Dubai, creating a 
regional center for small traders, craftsmen, and seafarers. Hence, Dubai’s economy was 
able to survive the pearling depression because of the diverse activities of the merchant 
class, with Sheikh Maktoum bin Hasher playing a vitl role in the development of that 
class. 22 
 The second leader whose initiatives and decisions c tributed to the development 
of Dubai’s economy was Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al-Maktoum, who ruled Dubai from 
1958-1990 and was the eighth ruler of the Al-Maktoum family. During his reign, Sheikh 
Rashid expanded Dubai’s entrepreneurial and commercial fo us to promote growth in the 
Emirate. Generations of merchants, due to the relocation of Lingah merchants, resided in 
                                                 
 
 
20 Hvidt, M. (2006). Governance in Dubai: The emergence of political and economic ties betweent eh 
public and the private sector. Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies University of Southern 
Denmark, University of Southern Denmark. 6: 1-28. 
   
21 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geograpy. London, 
University of Portsmouth: 45. 
 
22 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geography. London, 
University of Portsmouth: 45. 
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Dubai and were involved in trade with Northeast Africa, Asia, and India. Sheikh Rashid 
focused on expanding Dubai as an entrepot of trade by developing and improving 
infrastructure. 
 In 1959, the large volume of trader traffic through the Creek of Dubai began to 
cause severe silting problems. Widening and dredging the Creek of Dubai was expensive, 
and the government would need to impose a 4% custom fee tax on the merchants in order 
to complete the project. The merchants cooperated and the expansion of the creek 
allowed the world’s largest modern shipping vessels to reach Dubai.23 Dubai became the 
originating port and the stopover point for large ship  in transit, resulting in the blooming 
of trade and exposure of foreign merchants to Dubai’s economy. The high volume of 
trade enabled Sheikh Rashid to use tax revenue to modernize the city by building roads, 
improving electricity, and revamping water systems. 24 
A second developmental project by Sheikh Rashid which contributed greatly to 
diversifying Dubai’s economy was the development of Dubai’s first international airport 
in 1960. Government officials borrowed an airport development strategy from Qatar, 
which abandoned construction of its own airport. Dubai’s airport was a success, and 
eventually became home to nine airlines. The development of infrastructure projects such 
as the Creek and the International Airport, under th  leadership of Sheikh Rashid, 
enhanced the growth of commercial activities and tra e. The percentage of business 





24 Franco, J. (2007). Dubai's Economy to Cushion UAE's Diminishing Oil  Reserves. Khaleej Times 
Online. 
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activity in Dubai increased due to the influx of foreigners entering and trading with 
Emirate merchants.   
  Despite the discovery of oil in 1966 and the exploitation of oil in 1969, the 
political and economic landscape of Dubai did not change. Dubai was a production state 
and did not become an allocation state after the discovery of oil. Sheikh Rashid 
understood that nursing a business environment based on trade was more promising than 
relying on a limited oil supply, which was expected o run out in 2010.25 Under the 
leadership of Sheikh Rashid, oil revenues were alloc ted to fund infrastructure 
development projects, such as Port Rashid, a harbour outside the Creek of Dubai. 26 By 
1978, this port could handle the largest container vessels. In the following year, Jebel Ali 
Port was established through oil revenues, becoming the world’s largest man made port 
in the Middle East. The development of these ports contributed to Dubai’s economy in 
commerce and trade and created a hub for businesses and foreign investors. Overall, 
Sheikh Rashid used the oil revenues to implement changes in the infrastructure and 
commerce in Dubai, paving the way for greater developmental strategies with subsequent 
rulers.27  
After Sheikh Rashid’s death, Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (1990-
2006) was responsible for the next phase of development in Dubai, including Dubai’s 
                                                 
 
 
25 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geographyf. London, 
University of Portsmouth: 45. 
  
26 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geography. London, 
University of Portsmouth: 45. 
  




2010 vision.28 The growth of Dubai’s economy can be attributed to the vision of Sheikh 
Rashid bin Saeed and Sheikh Maktoum bin Hasher becaus  they developed infrastructure 
and a merchant class instrumental for trade. Dubai, by the 1980s, had become a hub for 
commercial activity and the stage was set for Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum.  
During the reign of Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid, the concept of free trade 
envisioned by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed was further established. He created a more liberal 
regulatory environment by promoting free trade policies and creating cities in Dubai 
based on specific industries.29 Companies of the same industry that were established in 
close proximity to each other were exempt from taxation. In addition to that, Sheikh 
Maktoum’s strongest development policy was based on transforming Dubai into a 
tourism destination.30 The Jumeriah group was established in 1997 to develop five-star 
luxury hotels in Dubai, designing and creating the Burj Al-Arab and Medinat Jumeriah. 
Dubai established itself as a center of tourism with the development of five-star resorts, 
world-class shopping, dining, and entertainment projects.  
The subsequent ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, has 
initiated his own development policies since 2006. However, Dubai’s economic success 
can be attributed to the decisions of Sheikh Maktoum bin Hasher, Sheikh Rashid bin 
Saeed, and Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid. Even though economic initiatives of the rulers 
                                                 
 
 
28 DeNicola, C. (2005). Dubai's Political and Economic Development: An Oasis in the Desert? Political 




30 Hvidt, M. (2006). Governance in Dubai: The emergence of political and economic ties between the 
public and the private sector. Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies University of Southern 
Denmark. 6: 1-28. 
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are extremely important in analyzing development, it is also of integral importance to 
assess the relationship between the merchant class and the government.  
The merchant class of Dubai continued to cooperate with the decisions of the leaders 
because of strong business government relation. The merchant class was cooperative to 
the policies of the leaders even though no formal government bodies existed to represent 
merchant interests. Informal majlis, consisting of a group of leaders that functioned in 
place of a formal government organization, were used as a forum for senior government 
officials and business leaders to exchange ideas, sh re information, and solve economic 
problems.31 The majlis also provided the Sheikhs’ with the opprtunity to educate the 
merchant class on their incentives, decisions, and development plans. In time, the majlis 
became a consultative channel between the ruler and the citizens.32 The discovery of oil 
did not change the political structure between the rul rs and merchants in Dubai; oil 
consolidated a neo-patrimonial relationship in which e onomic development policies 
stemmed from the leader who held sole governing power.33 Private businessmen who 
exhibited success in their entrepreneurship activities, regardless of their patronage and 
loyalty, were invited by the ruler to advocate their own development policies. 34
                                                 
 
 
31 Franco, J. (2007). Dubai's Economy to Cushion UAE's Diminishing Oil  Reserves. Khaleej Times 
Online. 
  
32 Little, C. (2007). Understanding the Economic Development of Dubai. Human Geography. London, 
University of Portsmouth: 45. 
  
33 Hvidt, M. (2006). Governance in Dubai: The emergence of political and economic ties betweent eh 
public and the private sector. Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies University of Southern 




The ruling family in Dubai was not the most influential group in promoting economic 
development policies. The government of Dubai differed from those of other Gulf States 
because of its strong business-government relations and is characterized as an extremely 
political government but with business fervor. For example, Mohammed Ali Alabbar, the 
director general of Dubai’s Department of Economic Development and the vice chairman 
of an aluminum and cable company, encouraged Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid to sell 
Dubai’s land to foreign real estate investors as a source of revenue for the government. 
Alabbar ensured that wealth was distributed between th  government of Dubai and his 
enterprise. This demonstrates that Sheikhs, merchants, d members of the business 
community are linked through various public-private ties, which ultimately promotes 
economic development. 35  
In summary, Dubai was successful in diversifying its economy because of its 
leader’s decisions to allocate oil revenues to infrastructure projects and the cooperative 
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Kuwait was established in 1760 under the leadership of the Al-Sabah dynasty, and 
became a British protectorate in 1899. Sheikh Abdallah Al-Salem Al-Sabah declared 
Kuwait’s independence in 1961, establishing Kuwait as a constitutional monarchy with a 
parliamentary system consisting of a National Assembly.36 First inaugurated in 1961, the 
National Assembly is composed of fifty members elect d by popular vote. The economy 
of Kuwait is dominated by the export of petroleum, which was first discovered by Kuwait 
Oil Company in 1938. Currently, petroleum accounts for nearly half of the GDP, 95% of 
export revenues, and 80% of government income. 37 
The modern history of Kuwait began with the settlement of the Bani Utub tribe, 
which consisted of merchants and three major families: Al-Sabah, Al-Khalifa, and Al-
Jalahima. Each of the three families assumed control of a different duty; the Al-Sabah 
family was in charge of political affairs, the Al-Khalifa family handled economic affairs, 
and the Al-Jalahima family handled security. In the early 1760s, after a dispute with the 
Al-Sabah family, the Al-Khalifa family migrated to Qatar.38  During the late 18th and 19th 
Centuries, the elite merchant families of the Bani Utub were heavily involved in the 
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prosperous pearling industry with East Africa and Iia.39 The ruling Al-Sabah family 
was completely dependent on the wealth received from taxing the merchant class for 
political survival. Subsequently, the elite merchant f milies and ruling family entered into 
a strong symbiotic relationship in which politics needed commerce. 40
The modern history of Kuwaiti leadership began in 1896 with the rule of Sheikh 
Mubarak bin Sabah Al Sabah (1837-1915), also known as Mubarak the Great, whose 
decisions would continue to influence economic development in the following decades.41 
Mubarak the Great was a determined leader whose goal was to strengthen the ruling Al-
Sabah’s leadership and Kuwait’s position in the Gulf. In 1899, Kuwait became a British 
protectorate, with the British government agreeing to provide monetary payments to the 
Al-Sabah family in order to secure their family income and political standing. Sheikh 
Mubarak wanted to achieve financial independence from the merchant families and 
reinforce Al-Sabah political leadership, especially his role as the ruler, by creating state-
building initiatives based on his own interests rather than those of the merchants.42 
Sheikh Mubarak imposed a mandatory tax law on the merchant families, and used the 
associated revenues to support his political agendas. In 1909, Mubarak chose to ban pearl 
diving, which caused many merchant families to migrate to Iraq, though many would 
                                                 
 
 
39 Moore, P. W. (2004). Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Kuwait and 
Jordan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
  
40 Crystal, J. (1989). "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar." Comparative Politics 21(4): 427-
443. 
 
41 Moore, P. W. (2004). Doing business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and 
Kuwait, Cambridge University Press. 
  
42 Moore, P. W. (2004). Doing business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and 
Kuwait, Cambridge University Press. 
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return to pledge their loyalty to the leader.43 Mubarak’s decisions and state-building 
initiatives, which led to strife between the ruling family and merchant class, exemplify 
the intention of the rulers to achieve financial independence and improve their political 
position by subjugating the merchant class.  
The introduction of Japanese pearls into the market, combined with the effects of 
a world-wide depression, placed the Kuwaiti economy in severe distress during the 
1930s. Discontent among the merchant class was so great that an opposition group known 
as al-Majlis al-Umaa al-Tashri’i (the People’s Legislative Council) was assembled, which 
consisted of fourteen members from the elite merchant families.  The decisions of Sheikh 
Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait from 192 -1950, were critical during that 
unstable time period. Sheikh Ahmad agreed to the elections, thereby creating a new 
National Assembly whose members demanded reforms to end monopolies, reduce taxes, 
and build education systems.44 Sheikh Ahmad did not oppose these reforms and was in 
favor of building systems that would improve social development.  
However, the discovery of oil in the Burgan Field in 1938 caused Sheikh Ahmad 
to dissolve the National Assembly because of the merchants’ demands to turn over oil 
revenues.45 The reforms were jeopardizing Sheikh Ahmad’s power and jurisdiction 
considerably, and by conforming to the merchants’ demands, the sovereignty of the 
                                                 
 
 
43 Crystal, J. (1990). Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge 
University Press. 
  
44 Moore, P. W. (2004). Doing business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and 
Kuwait, Cambridge University Press. 
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ruling family would be compromised.46 Al-Sabah leadership was committed to 
developing the oil industry because oil revenues would provide the ruling family with 
financial independence from the merchants. Rulers would use oil revenues to accomplish 
objectives such as buying merchants out of politics, developing new allies in the national 
population, and creating a new administrative network based on the ruling family. Sheikh 
Abdallah III Al-Salim Al Sabah (1950-1965), who began his reign as the ruler of Kuwait 
in 1950 after the death his cousin Sheikh Ahmad, would play an important role in 
administrating these objectives.  
During the reigns of Sheikh Abdallah and Sheikh Ahmad, oil revenues replaced 
taxes and British monetary payments to the ruling family. In sharp contrast to Dubai, 
Kuwait failed to efficiently channel oil revenues toward the development of infrastructure 
in the state. Instead, Sheikh Abdallah first instituted regular oil payments to prominent 
Al-Sabah family members and expanded their role in state politics. For example, sons 
and grandsons held the post of cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and defense department 
officials; moreover, each department answered directly to the ruler. In 1952, a 
Development board was established under the instruction of Sheikh Abdallah to execute 
economic planning initiatives and projects, however, all positions of authority were 
granted to members of the Al-Sabah family who were close allies to the ruler. 
Additionally, the Development Board contracted infrast ucture projects only to local 
developers who were close allies to Sheikh Abdallah. Unlike in Dubai, the results of the 
projects were extremely poor because the ruler failed to provide adequate funding and 





each party worked to their best interest only.47 In fact, the entire process was ad hoc in 
that it completely depended on the will of the rule, which made for inefficient decision 
making and allocation of resources between the merchants and ruling family.  
The development projects of Sheikh Abdallah in the 1950s are characterized as 
large scale and ill coordinated, with skewed profit distribution. Sheikh Abdallah 
instituted a 15-year development plan in 1951, which failed due to corruption, cost 
overruns, and the government’s inability to monitor expenses.48 In 1953, a crisis emerged 
in which the ruler had to borrow money from the merchants to pay off the debts of the 
plan. Eventually, the debt was paid off and development was only successful in providing 
basic services such as roads, mosques, electricity, and water. 49 The government of 
Kuwait, unlike that of Dubai, was not successful in implementing infrastructure projects 
and the failure of their plans illustrates poor decision making by the government. 
Furthermore, unlike Dubai, the state did not use oil revenues to promote trade and the 
development of non-oil industries. Instead, oil revenues were used to fund domestic 
ordinary expenditures such as wages to civil servants, education, housing, and healthcare. 
The government created incentives for the labor force to join the public sector, hence 
over 60% of the labor force entered public sector employment.50 The International Bank 
                                                 
 
 





49 Moore, P. W. (2004). Doing business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and 
Kuwait, Cambridge University Press. 
  
50 Kaboudan, M. A. (1988). "Oil Revenue and Kuwait's Economy: An Econometric Approach." 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 20(1): 45-66. 
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for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was asked by the Kuwaiti government to 
evaluate the economy of Kuwait in 1961. The IBRD argued that no separation existed 
between the public duty and private interest of civil servants, and that officials in high 
ranks participate in commercial and private activities. 51 
On the whole, Kuwait became a rentier state because oil r venues were used to 
provide economic and social development without taxation. The political participation of 
the public diminished and government control was centralized around the ruling family.52 
Kuwait’s economy underwent an economic boom in the 1970s due to the rise in oil 
prices, which brought unprecedented wealth to the government.53 During this time period, 
Kuwaiti leadership continued to focus on gaining autonomy through distributional 
mechanisms, rather than using revenues to promote the development of new industries 
and infrastructure. Public expenditures grew by 26 percent annually and civil service jobs 
came to represent 75 percent of the workforce.54 The Kuwaiti government focused on two 
areas, social services and employment, in order to nsure that Kuwaitis would have 
access to free healthcare, education, and a variety of subsidized goods and services. In 
addition, the ruler during this time period, Sheikh Sabah III Salim Al-Sabah (1965-1977) 
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altered distributional policies to favor new busines leaders who could rival the upper 
social stratum of merchants.55 Sheikh Sabah accomplished this by supporting a new 
economic elite comprised of younger Kuwaitis, Shiites and Bedouins, who all pledged 
loyalty to the ruling family.56 During his reign, Sheikh Sabah worked to uphold his 
predecessors’ main objectives: economic largesse and political autonomy.  
During the 1970s, massive state interference in the private sector by the state 
continued through new laws which enabled new merchants to access and dominate the 
private sector. Ruling family members used their leverage to win state contracts for 
companies and pressed the ruler to punish competing merchants.57 The success of 
entrants into the private sector was based on favoritism and the projected payoff of 
activities; little consideration was given to the promise of societal benefit. 58 Kuwaiti 
merchants sought to increase their prestige, power, and wealth by cooperating with the 
economic initiatives of the government, which in reality were unproductive with respect 
to development. As a result, the economy of Kuwait encountered serious blows in the 
following decades.  
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Economic development policies of the government, unproductive 
entrepreneurship activities, and the fall of the stock market led to repercussions which 
dominated Kuwait’s economy well into the 1990s. The economy of Kuwait was 
compromised after the crash of the stock market, Souq al-Manakh, in 1982. At that time, 
there were five thousand individual debts totaling to $92 billion, which were not backed 
by local banks.59 Government initiatives, under the leadership of Sheik  Jaber Al-Sabah, 
funded the shortfall and the state ran a deficit well into the 1990s.60 In addition, Kuwait’s 
economy took a blow with the Gulf War, which precipitated a return of the Parliament, 
Islamist opposition to liberalizing the economy, and complete reliance on the policies of 
the state with respect to economic development. 61 
Prior to the discovery of oil, a merchant elite was established which participated 
in the pearl industry, shipbuilding, and long-distance commerce that dominated the 
economy until the pearl depression.62 More importantly, the merchant class was 
extremely powerful because they provided the funding of the ruling Al-Sabah family 
through voluntary taxes. The relationship can be characterized as economic dependence 
and political counterbalance.63 However, this relationship changed considerably during 
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the reign of Sheikh Mubarak and changed even more so on the eve of the discovery oil. 
Unlike in Dubai, where the discovery of oil aided development, in Kuwait it hindered 
development. The merchant class felt a sense of political entitlement due to their 
historical financial interdependent relationship with the royal family, believing they had a 
right to state wealth.64  However, the ruling Al-Sabah family and the leaders were 
determined to achieve financial independence and political autonomy from the merchant 
class. Regardless of any of the opposition movements, the Al-Sabah leadership was 
extremely successful in achieving this objective. For example, Sheikh Abdallah, sensing 
that the merchants were discontent with his distribu ion policies, attempted to appease the 
merchants by using oil revenues in various policies and programs designed to redistribute 
the wealth.65 For example, the government created the land acquisition program which 
used oil revenues for land acquisition from elite mrchants at inflated prices. Fifty 
percent of state expenditures were used for land acquisitions; the state purchased the land 
and resold it back to the asil merchants at prices below the market price.66 The merchants 
made significant profits from this deal because they rented the land at high prices to other 
merchants. 67 The IBRD commented on this program, concluding: 
The Government buys land at highly inflated prices for development projects and 
for resale to private buyers. Land purchases amounted to between KD 40 million 
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and KD 60 million in most recent years. Whatever th political or development 
justifications for this practice, the prices fixed by the Government for these 
transactions and the small amount thus far collected on the resale of the land make 
the public land transaction a rather indiscriminate and inequitable way of 
distributing the oil revenues. (IBRD; 1965)68 
          
 
In addition to that, Sheikh Abdallah’s developmental policies concentrated on creating 
new shareholding companies to create a public-private ownership. Merchants established 
a wide number of companies such as Kuwait Oil Tankers Company, Kuwait Hotels 
Company, and Kuwait Transportation Company: companies in which the government 
invested a considerable amount of startup equity.69 Consequently, the government 
controlled about fifty percent of the shares of each company and had the opportunity to 
appoint royal family members in the executive board.70 A dependent relationship grew 
between the merchants and ruling family because the gov rnment was providing 
generous incentives to the merchant class in return for public investment in private 
companies. 71 The merchants in Dubai were a major part of the economic growth; while 
in Kuwait, they relied on the government for economic growth and success.  
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Merchants would continue to fight for political participation and access to 
decision making to influence development by participating in the National Assembly and 
creating the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In 1961, Kuwait gained 
independence from the British government and, after two years, elections were held for 
the National Assembly (Majlis al Umma). 72 The National Assembly was a consultative 
body because it could only accept, amends, or reject legislation submitted by the Prime 
Minster, demonstrating absolute control of the government. As a result, laws were 
formulated according to policies of the government and the merchant’s role in 
influencing policy was minimal because the National Assembly was used as a venue to 
secure allies and isolate opponents by the government. Overall, Kuwait and Dubai may 
have developed venues for discussions and opinions; however, it seemed in the case of 
Dubai that merchants’ concerns and desires were met alongside with government 
objectives. In Kuwait, the objectives of the government were met first before the 
concerns of the merchants.  
The merchants were successful in the creation of the Kuwaiti Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (KCCI), a very important busine s and political institution 
composed of merchant elites who primarily focused on administrative access to policy 
making and enhancing their standing in the market.73 In the first assembly of 1963-1967, 
twenty-two KCCI allies were elected into the seats out of the total of fifty representatives. 
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Their lobbying efforts reveal their perseverance in trying to gain leverage in the economy 
and access to policy making. Regardless of the efforts, economic policy still remained as 
the final duty of the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers. The government 
continued to use the ministerial positions designated for the KCCI as a tool of reward and 
punishment. 74 
 In summary, economic development in Kuwait was slow because of the 
leadership of the Kuwaiti government and their incentives to allocate oil revenues.  
Oil revenues were not used towards the development of i frastructure and non-oil 
industries, which would aid in economic growth and prosperity. Furthermore, the 
merchants were constantly in the shadow of government policies due to the Kuwaiti 



















Established as a British protectorate in 1916, Qatar gained its independence in 
1971 under the leadership of Sheikh Abdalla Al-Thani. Qatar is a constitutional 
monarchy whose constitution, established in 2005, recognizes the hereditary rule of the 
Al-Thani family. The government of Qatar has three branches: judicial, executive 
(council of ministers), and legislative. Pending elections in 2008 will decide the 
establishment of a legislative council which would ensure that government ministers are 
accountable to state legislature. In Qatar, exports of oil and natural gas account for more 
than 60% of the GDP, 85% of export earnings, and 70% of government revenues. 75 
The modern history of Qatar began in 1872, when the Al-Khalifa and al-Jalahima 
families of the Bani Utub tribe left Kuwait and relocated to Zubara, a settlement located 
on Qatar’s western coast.76 By the 1770s, the Persian Empire had taken notice f the 
mercantilist profits of Zubara, which had become a well-known pearling center. The Bani 
Utub of Zubara and Kuwait joined with other Qatari ribes and attacked Bahrain in 1783. 
Most of the Al-Khalifa family left to settle in Bahrain, a move which would significantly 
impact Qatar’s political history. 77 Large families of the Bani Utub tribe left for Bahr in, 
                                                 
 
 








taking their political and economic trade ties with them. As a result, Qatar was left 
without any semblance of a centralized authority, and was ruled instead by transitory 
tribal leaders.78 The economy of the state was extremely poor due to the weak resource 
base and inhospitable climate. In time, Qatar’s economy, like Kuwait’s and Dubai’s, 
would rely heavily on the pearling industry. 79 The Al-Thani tribe, which was deeply 
rooted in pearling, eventually rose to power as the political and economic force in the 
state under the leadership of Muhammed Al-Thani. 80 
Sheikh Muhammed bin Thani Al-Thani was a prominent merchant who, upon 
signing a treaty with the British in 1868, became th  first Sheikh of Qatar to be 
recognized by Britain. Sheikh Muhammed Al-Thani’s decision to sign the treaty was 
extremely important because, due to Qatar’s small population and weak merchant class 
which could offer little opposition, it firmly established the Al-Thani as the ruling family 
of Qatar. Qatar’s economy prior to the discovery of oil was unlike Kuwait’s or Dubai’s; 
although Qatar participated in the pearling industry, i s trade sector was extremely weak 
because local divers did not participate in sailing or trade like other divers in Kuwait or 
Dubai. Rather, many would return to the desert after th  pearling season, preventing the 
development of a distinct merchant class which could challenge the rule of the Al-Thani 
family. The relationship between the merchant class and ruling family was unlike 
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Kuwait’s; instead, the merchant class had very little political power because their 
revenues went into the hands of the ruling family without political participation in return. 
After the fall of the pearling industry, many Qatari merchants migrated to look for other 
opportunities and nomadic Bedouin represented majority f the Qatari society. 81 As a 
result, unlike Dubai, Qatar did not have any institutionalized developments prior to the 
discovery of oil. The economic and political history f Qatar would change significantly 
after the discovery of oil because oil revenues enabled the Al-Thani family to consolidate 
economic and political power in the state.   
 The discovery of oil occurred under the leadership of Sheikh Abdalla bin Jassim 
Al-Thani (1913-1948). Sheikh Abdalla’s economic decisions, relationship with royal 
family members, and political desires influenced Qatar’s economic development. Sheikh 
Abdalla’s relationship with royal family members was troublesome due to the lack of 
political support. 82 Sheikh Abdalla came into power, in 1913, after the death of his 
father, Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammad Al-Thani. His ascen ion to power was heavily 
contested by his twelve brothers and cousins, who all refused to take an oath endorsing 
him as the governor of Doha. 83 Sheikh Abdalla had the opportunity to turn to an external 
ally, the British government, based on the relationship previously established by Sheikh 
Mohammed. In November of 1916, a mutual agreement was signed between the two 
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parties which guaranteed Sheikh Abdalla’s domestic power and his son Sheikh Hamad as 
the heir. 84 Although Sheikh Abdalla was legitimately recognized by the British 
government as Qatar’s leader, his failure to earn the political support of his family 
resulted in internal tensions. Strife between family embers was a characteristic seen in 
subsequent generations of Qatari leaders. 85 
 
Sheikh Abdalla’s economic decisions after the discovery of oil included an 
agreement between the British government and Qatar in May 1935. According to this 
agreement, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was to have se enty-five years of exclusive 
oil rights in Qatar. Sheikh Abdalla agreed to this treaty since he would receive a generous 
yearly income and political recognition as the leader of the Qatar, regardless of internal 
family dissent.86 The exploitation of oil began in 1947, after the economic crisis of the 
interwar period, and Qatar’s economy was dominated by the oil industry. The only non-
oil economic activity was small overland trade with Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Abdalla 
strategically negotiated a series of agreements with foreign oil contractors and these 
agreements were handled by only members of two merchant families, Al-Mani and 
Darwish, who survived the interwar economic crisis.87 Sheikh Abdalla intentionally 
placed Salih Al-Mani and Abdalla Darwish in the negotiation agreements to curtail any 
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dissent from the merchant class and solidify their ti s with the palace. As a result, the 
only two main merchant families would no longer be threats to the Sheikh’s power. 88 
The agreements enabled Sheikh Abdalla to accumulate a substantial amount of 
wealth from oil revenues and yearly income from the British government. Only a limited 
amount of revenue was placed in the economy for the purpose of development and a 
limited amount was granted to ruling family members. A report by the Financial Times, 
although written in 1981, assesses the situation by stating, “money supply is controlled 
by the amir in such a personal way that bankers claim to be able to tell when he is on 
holiday.” 89 Consequently, this triggered dissent since his ownfamily, who formed a 
considerable bulk of the population, was excluded from the political process and wealth. 
Sheikh Abdalla’s decisions were completely personal a d autocratic in that he granted 
political access to court favorites, certain domestic merchants, and his son Hamad.90 
Sheikh Hamad was the only individual who was included in all his decisions and, by the 
early 1940’s, Hamad had become the virtual ruler of Qatar.  91 However, Sheikh Hamad’s 
death in May 1948 created a succession crisis that would ultimately impede development 
in Qatar for decades.  
Economic development initiatives required funds andthe programs failed not 
because of insufficient revenue; rather, these initiatives had to compete with the Qatari 













ruling family’s desire to acquire wealth. In Qatar, the impact of oil was that it increased 
the demands of the royal family members who were bent on acquiring a piece of the 
wealth. After the reign of Sheikh Abdalla, Sheikh Ali bin Abdalla (1949-1960) became 
the new leader of Qatar and Sheikh Khalifa the heir apparent. The Al-Thani family was 
so dissatisfied with the amount of wealth appropriated to them by Sheikh Abdalla that 
members petitioned to Sheikh Ali for allowance increases. 92 Family members threatened 
to riot against the Sheikh, if he were to deny those increases. Internal strife was so great 
between family members that the British foreign office helped draft a fiscal budget. The 
British also urged the state to diversify its economy by developing natural gas, foreign 
investments, and fishing (a local industry which had potential). The implementation of 
the budget and advice from the British was not heeded by Sheikh Ali. More importantly, 
he failed to meet the demands of his family and was abdicated from office in October 
1960, after which the affairs of the state were turned over to his son Shiekh Ahmad rather 
than Sheikh Khalifa. 93  
The poor decisions made by Sheikh Ahmad with respect to allocating revenues 
and confronting his family severely impeded the development of Qatar’s economy. 
Sheikh Ahmad decided the best policy was to comply and divide the oil revenues equally 
between the family and state. As a result, the ruler received 25% of oil revenues, ruling 











family members took 25%, and the state received 50%.94 Per British recommendation, 
the Qatari government initiated changes by creating state reserves, establishing gas- 
based petrochemical companies, and developing a handful of local industries and 
agriculture. However, these development projects failed due to insufficient funds, a 
problem also seen in Kuwait. The Qatari population resented the decisions of the ruling 
family and, in 1963, held an uprising against Sheik Ahmad. Angry Qatari citizens 
demanded the Sheikh to reduce his personal privileges, expand social services, reduce 
foreign labor in government, and establish a budget beneficial to development. 95 More 
importantly, Sheikh Khalifa was the leader of the popular uprising which demonstrates 
that the government did not have an institutionalized system of dispute resolution within 
the family. After the strike was over, Sheikh Ahmad promised equality, justice, and 
stability, and established laws which provided social and economic services to Qatari 
citizens. 96 Although Sheikh Ahmad promised a set of new objectiv s, he remained 
abroad during the troubled times. Sheikh Khalifa took advantage of the absence, gaining 
the consent of the Qatari people to oust Sheikh Ahmad and declare Qatar’s independence 
in 1971. 97 
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 Once Shiekh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani (1971-1995) became the leader of 
Qatar, he faced the same decision as previous leaders with respect to the demands of his 
family members. Sheikh Khalifa was the first leader who decided to devote more 
revenues towards development and acquiring popular s pport in the nation.98 Sheikh 
Khalifa borrowed from the ruler’s twenty-five percent share and added it to the state 
budget in order to fund social and economic development. With respect to economic 
development, a five-year plan was initiated in 1970 which focused on creating joint 
public-private ventures between the state and busines es.99 Sheikh Khalifa’s industrial 
ventures in the areas of fertilizer, petrochemicals, nd steel were extremely unsuccessful. 
For example, he initiated the development of a $275 million dollar steel plant which 
could only produce steel at three times the selling price. When world steel prices fell in 
the 1980s, the setbacks hurt the economy as did the ecr ase of oil prices in the 1980s.100 
Furthermore, Sheikh Khalifa’s policies of distribution, employment, and development 
contributed to uncontrollable bureaucratic growth in which personal relationships 
between government officials were extremely important. Because of Sheikh Khalifa’s 
development policies, the state became a machine for distributing revenues to 
government employees, citizens, and family members, similar to the Kuwaiti 
government. In all respects, the Qatari government b came a rentier and welfare state 
whose funds solely depended on oil revenues. When oil prices fell in 1980s, Sheikh 










Khalifa delayed development projects, such as the expansion of gas fields, and prompted 
substantial financial cutbacks that created dissent among both the public and the royal 
family.101 Once again, Sheikh Khalifa became vulnerable as a ruler and this vulnerability 
was reflected in the economy because, by the early 1990s, the only highly developed 
industry in Qatar was the oil industry. Sheikh Hamad deposed his father Sheikh Khalifa 
in 1995 with the intent of integrating Qatar into the world economy and promoting 
diversification. 102 
The second argument in this paper entails the role of the merchant class with 
respect to development. Prior to the discovery of oil, a merchant class existed in Qatar as 
in Kuwait and Dubai. Through all the dissent and chaos of the Al-Thani family, the 
merchants remained quiet. The Al-Mani and Darwish families were tied to the royal 
family through social and business agreements.103 The Amir created these relationships to 
gain political control over the merchants. Economic favors were granted to merchant 
families, but, in return, they had to renounce their claim to any form of government 
decision making and political participation. 104 The extraction of wealth from oil revenues 
also enabled the regime to develop a symbiotic relationship with the merchant class 
through its distributive policies. The Bedouins in the Qatari society strongly held to their 
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own tribal distribution customs. 105 As a result, the Amir used the revenues to distribu e 
oil wealth to all nationals. All Qatari citizens had ccess to education, housing, and a 
variety of subsidized goods without taxation.106 Since the population was receiving social 
services without taxation, loyalty to the government a d royal family was widespread 
amongst nationals. By providing these services for free, the government was promoting 
an image of responsibility to its citizens in the form of social services.107  
In summary, the business and state politics in Qatar was an expression of the 
internal decisions of the ruling family regarding distribution.108 Qatar’s economy was 
characterized as a business community which was subservient to the Sheikhs and ruling 
family members. The Sheikhs were known to be merchants first and rulers second. 109 In 
the Qatari government, the power was deinstitutional zed such that the sovereignty of the 
Amir was unlimited. The absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms, in addition 
to corruption within the family resulted in forced abdications: Abdalla to Ali (1949), Ali 
to Ahmad (1960), Ahmad to Khalifa (1972), and Khalifa to Hamad (1995). 110 Although 
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corruption and strife existed with respect to political power, the Al-Thani royal family 
was united on the basis of keeping governmental power within the family. Power has 






















The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that the resource curse theory alone 
cannot address the development outcome of all oil rich states. Dubai, though it is 
characterized as a rentier state, has enjoyed successful conomic development relative to 
other oil rich states.  The diversification of Dubai’s economy relative to those of Qatar 
and Kuwait is attributed to the rulers’ ongoing commitment to effective allocation of 
wealth. Throughout the century, each ruler of Dubai effectively channeled oil revenues 
into the development of new infrastructure and diversification of the economy. These 
initiatives were not taken by the rulers of Kuwait, who were preoccupied with gaining 
autonomy from the merchant class and establishing temselves as the political and 
economic powerhouse of the state. Economic development in Qatar was impeded by 
internal strife within the ruling family and forced abdications of the rulers. This study has 
proven that an effective analysis of economic development in oil-producing states must 
address the decisions of the rulers regarding allocati n of revenues, as well as the role of 
the merchant class. It is not effective to simply argue that development is hindered 
because oil is a resource curse.  
Currently, Dubai is under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-
Maktoum, who became the leader of Dubai after the death of Sheikh Maktoum bin 
Rashid Al-Maktoum. Sheikh Mohammed maintains a successful economy by following 
the policy traditions of the Al-Maktoum leaders: encouraging investment, establishing 
free trade zones, and promoting Dubai as a premier tourist destination in the Middle East.  
 38 
The success of Dubai’s economic development strategies has prompted other 
Middle Eastern states to promote economic diversification and integration into the world 
economy. The development and diversification plans in Qatar and Kuwait are a result of 
Dubai’s economic competitiveness in the region. Currently, the Kuwaiti government is 
trying to implement a five-year economic diversification plan, which would begin in 
2009.111 The aims of this plan are to attract foreign investment, encourage privatization, 
improve the real estate market, and promote the devlopment of the non-oil sector, which 
now accounts for only 10% of state revenues. However, Kuwait continues to face 
obstacles because parliament and government fail to chieve consensus on economic 
development projects. 112 The Amir of Kuwait, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, has 
dissolved the Parliament on many occasions because of th unresolved conflict between 
parliament members and the Kuwaiti government. On the other hand, Qatar has been 
more successful in diversifying and developing its economy away from the oil sector 
under the leadership of Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani.  
The growing diversification and modernization in Qatar is a result of Sheikh 
Hamad’s dedication to expanding the development of Qatar’s natural gas reserves, 
increasing foreign investment in non-energy sectors, and promoting tourism. The 
administration is allocating revenues to develop infrastructures such as a $2 billion 
                                                 
 
 





international airport and manmade Pearl Island. 113 Qatar is now home to a wide variety 
of tourist attractions such as Qatar National Library and the Museum of Islamic Arts. In 
addition, Qatar received international recognition when it hosted the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in 2001. 114 
Sheikh Rashid, the ruler of Dubai from 1979-1990, once said: “my grandfather 
rode a camel, my father rode a camel, I drive a Mercedes, my son drives a Land Rover, 
his son will drive a Land Rover, but his son will ride a camel.” 115 His quote accurately 
exemplifies some truth about the economies in the Middle East. In order for an oil state to 
be successful, diversification beyond the oil sector and integration into the world 
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